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Ofﬁcial development assistance currently totals around US$130 billion per year, an order of
magnitude greater than international climate ﬁnance. To safeguard development progress
and secure the long-term effectiveness of these investments, projects must be designed to be
resilient to climate change. This article reviews 250 projects for three countries from two
development organisations and ﬁnds that between 2% and 30% of these may require action
now to “future-proof” investments and policies. Both organisations show improvements in
the recognition of climate change in projects, but many projects are still not future-proof.
L’aide ofﬁcielle au développement s’élève actuellement à environ 130 milliards de dollars par
an, montant supérieur à celui du ﬁnancement international de la lutte contre le changement
climatique. Pour protéger les progrès du développement et garantir l’efﬁcacité à long terme
de ces investissements, les projets doivent être conçus de manière à être résilients face au
changement climatique. Cet article examine 250 projets menés dans trois pays par deux
organisations de développement et constate qu’entre 2 et 30 % d’entre eux requièrent une
action dès à présent pour protéger les investissements et les politiques des aléas futurs
éventuels. Les deux organisations afﬁchent des progrès sur le plan de la reconnaissance du
changement climatique dans les projets, mais nombre de projets ne sont pas encore à
l’épreuve du temps.
La ayuda oﬁcial destinada al desarrollo alcanza alrededor de 130 mil millones de dólares por
año, un orden de magnitud mayor que el orientado a responder a los efectos del cambio
climático a nivel mundial. Con el ﬁn de salvaguardar el avance del desarrollo y de
garantizar la efectividad a largo plazo de estas inversiones, los proyectos deberán tomar en
cuenta los efectos producidos por el cambio climático. El presente artículo informa sobre los
resultados de una revisión efectuada a 250 proyectos impulsados por dos organizaciones de
desarrollo en tres países. Se encontró que entre 2 % y 30 % de dichos proyectos requieren
actualmente la implementación de cambios que los hagan pertinentes para las inversiones y
las políticas a futuro. Ambas organizaciones han instrumentado modiﬁcaciones en algunos
proyectos de manera que respondan al cambio climático; sin embargo, otros proyectos
permanecen sin considerar esta proyección a futuro.
Keywords: Environment (built and natural) – Climate change; Aid; South Asia; Sub-Saharan
Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean
Introduction
Tackling climate change is widely recognised as crucial to achieving long-term sustainable
poverty alleviation. Poverty alleviation and climate change are intimately linked (Stern 2007)
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as the poorest people tend to suffer the greatest impacts and have the least capacity to adapt. Even
today climate shocks, like droughts, ﬂooding, and storms, have a material impact on the develop-
ment prospects of the poorest countries. Since 1980, weather-related catastrophes have caused
almost 1.2 million fatalities and led to direct damages amounting to US$610 billion in low
income (LICs) and lower-middle income countries (LMICs).1 For the poorest in society, these
direct impacts can have a long-term inﬂuence on economic prospects.
Climate change is expected to increase the intensity and frequency of climate shocks in
many regions (IPCC 2012). In parallel, gradual changes in climate such as rising temperatures,
changing rainfall patterns, and sea level rise, will affect human health, food systems, water
supplies, and ecosystems. This will create a more challenging environment for development
(World Bank 2010, 2013a). Climate change will also interact with other pressures, such as
population growth, urbanisation, resource scarcity, and conﬂict, which will multiply risks to
development.
Without appropriate interventions, climate change could create a vicious circle of growing
vulnerability and impacts; the poor could be driven deeper into poverty and the gains achieved
through development cooperation may be reversed (World Bank 2010). This risk is high on
the political agenda. The May 2013 report of the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development
Agenda reiterated that “without tackling climate change, we will not succeed in eradicating
extreme poverty” (UN 2013, p. 55).
Many development agencies acknowledge that adapting to climate change is critical to
achieving broader development goals.2 As part of the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries
agreed to mobilise US$100 billion per year to support adaptation and mitigation by 2020.3 The
UK has committed a budget of GB£3.87 billion to the International Climate Fund (ICF)
between April 2011 and March 2015, of which around half is allocated to adaptation and the
remainder to low-carbon development and forestry. Together, the multilateral development
banks provided US$3.7 billion in adaptation ﬁnance in 2011 alone.4
Yet this represents only a small fraction of total development assistance. For example, ofﬁcial
development assistance (ODA) reached around US$130 billion per year from OECD DAC
(Development Assistance Committee) countries over the period 2010–12.5 It is crucial to
ensure that these core programmes are resilient to future climate change. Klein (2001) describes
three ways in which climate change could affect development projects:
. The direct risk to the expected long-term outcome of projects. Certain projects are particu-
larly sensitive to climate change, like those involving water supplies, food, natural
resources management, human health, and disaster resilience. In addition, capital invest-
ments, such as roads, bridges, major irrigation systems, and dams, last for many decades
and so may have to operate under a set of climatic conditions for which they were not
designed.
. The indirect risk to the expected outcome of the projects. Climate change alters the natural,
social, economic, and political environment in which projects operate. So an impact in one
part of the world may have signiﬁcant implications for another though global supply chains.
. The effects of the project and its outcomes on the vulnerability of communities or ecosys-
tems to climate change. Many projects can have co-beneﬁts that help reduce vulnerability to
climate change but there can also be unintended negative consequences; projects can inﬂu-
ence the vulnerability of communities (potentially irreversibly) well beyond the formal end
of the project. This can potentially lead to a situation where short-term interventions result
in “long-term maladaptation, increasing vulnerability to climate shocks” (Brooks, Grist,
and Brown 2009, p. 741).
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“Climate-prooﬁng” involves designing and implementing projects in such a way that they
achieve their desired objectives (outcomes) irrespective of current variability and future climate
change and avoid any negative impacts on the long-term vulnerability of people or economies
(Klein et al. 2007; OECD 2009). This is a material issue for development organisations (Klein
et al. 2007). For example, a review in 2006 concluded that 40% of World Bank projects were at
signiﬁcant risk from climate (World Bank 2006). An OECD analysis assessed all ofﬁcial aid
ﬂows from 1998 to 2000 to six developing countries and found that US$ half a billion per
year in ﬂows to Bangladesh and Egypt, and about US$200 million to Nepal and Tanzania,
were at risk from climate change (van Aalst and Agrawala 2004). In 2006 OECD member
states made a commitment to integrate adaptation into development cooperation (OECD
2006). This is now a public commitment made by many development organisations. For
example, in DFID’s 2011–2015 Business Plan there is a commitment to make programmes
more “climate-smart” (DFID 2011a).
However, a critical question for aid agencies is where additional action is required today to
manage expected climate-related risks to projects in the future. In this paper, we refer to this as
“future-prooﬁng”.6 Investing in future-prooﬁng today is not necessarily the best course of
action in all cases as it can entail greater costs or trade-offs to secure beneﬁts that may not be
realised for a decade or more. For example, the World Bank (2006) estimated that accounting
for future climate in high-risk projects today could potentially increase project costs by
between 5% and 15%.7 Dercon (2012) and Béné et al. (2012) highlight that adaptation can in
some cases entail a productivity trade-off. These costs and trade-offs of future-prooﬁng must
be weighed against the urgent need to allocate resources where they can have the greatest
impact on poverty reduction today.
This article sets out to identify where future-prooﬁng might be justiﬁed as an immediate
action. Our central hypothesis is that although many projects could be deemed to be at risk
from climate change (e.g., that 40% of World Bank projects), in only a small number of cases
is additional action justiﬁed today to manage expected future climate change. The article sets
out to test this hypothesis through the application of a framework to identify projects where
future-prooﬁng might be justiﬁed today.
In the second part of our analysis, we ask where there are signs that action may be justiﬁed
today how well this is identiﬁed by development organisations? Finally, we provide best practice
examples of different types of future-prooﬁng from recent development projects. Throughout, we
apply frameworks that are simple enough to be used routinely by aid agencies to identify projects
requiring additional analysis.
In the following section, we introduce the methodology for the study, including the proposed
framework for identifying where future-prooﬁng might be justiﬁed. We then give the ﬁndings
from the screening exercise for three countries and two development organisations, before con-
sidering how projects should be designed differently to account for long-term risks today and
drawing examples of best practice from recent programmes. Finally, we discuss the ﬁndings,
with a focus on the barriers to future-prooﬁng in practice.
Methodology
Conceptual framework for future-prooﬁng
The framework aims to identify where additional future-prooﬁng action is likely to be justiﬁed
today despite the potential costs and trade-offs. To do this fully would require detailed cost-
beneﬁt analyses. We introduce a simple qualitative approach to screen projects based on the fra-
meworks outlined in Fankhauser, Smith, and Tol (1999).
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Fankhauser, Smith, and Tol (1999) lay out an economic framework for appraising the optimal
timing of adaptation; where there are beneﬁts to adapting now to future climate and where this can
be left until later given the additional costs that may be involved.8 They conclude that early action
is likely to be justiﬁed in the case of “quasi-irreversible investments with a long lifetime (e.g.
infrastructure investments, development of coastal zones)”, where they suggest that “precaution-
ary adjustments may be called for to increase the robustness of structures, or to increase the rate
of depreciation to allow for earlier replacement” (p. 67). Another important area identiﬁed by
Fankhauser et al. (2013) is where there are long-lead times for action. This includes for
example, research and development, building institutional capacity, and migration out of
hazard-prone areas.
In the context of development projects these studies suggest three areas where additional
action today is justiﬁed to adapt to future risks:
(1) Long-lived, investments with large sunk costs, such as hydropower stations, roads, dams,
and other infrastructure. A failure to account for climate change upfront in such long-
lived investments could mean that they underperform (e.g., in the case of water supply
systems and hydropower) or become exposed to increasing damage. This could mean
that investments need to be retroﬁtted or replaced prematurely, imposing greater costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the lifetime of different investments; new transport and energy infra-
structure can last for 40 years or more, large dams for at least 60 years, and patterns of
urban development (the layout of suburbs, roads, and other infrastructure in a city), for
more than 100 years. The climate is likely to be very different on these timescales.
Capital investments are particularly prone to maladaptation because they tend to be dif-
ﬁcult to change over time.
(2) Long-term planning and policy-making, such as growth strategies, sector development
plans, a poverty reduction strategy, coastal development plans, drought contingency
plans, and urban zoning can have far-reaching and complex consequences that inﬂuence
vulnerability for decades. In some cases, they will have positive co-beneﬁts for long-term
resilience, for example, through strengthening governance, building capacity, and
increasing access to credit. But in a few cases there is a risk of maladaptation when
people are inadvertently committed to greater and difﬁcult-to-reverse decisions that
may increase the risk from climate change. This includes:
. Social protection systems can increase resilience to climate shocks but will need to be
adjusted over time to cope with the changing proﬁle of vulnerability and climate risks.
Figure 1. The timescales of different types of climate-sensitive decisions.
Note: Based on Stafford-Smith et al. 2011.
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If this adaptability is not built in from the start, systems can be difﬁcult to adjust over
time, due to political, social, or legislative barriers, making them less effective.
. A programme that promoted water-intensive agriculture may change behaviour semi-
irreversibly and be detrimental if the climate became drier (IEG 2012).
. A rural roads programme that built intersections on ﬂoodplains could lead to urban
development and put these communities at risk in the long term (IEG 2012).
. A project that built schools on a ﬂoodplain could, at best, limit access to education for
local children, or at worst, put them in danger (Save the Children 2008).
. Even short-lived projects, like climate-smart agriculture or rural development pro-
grammes, can cumulatively add-up to major changes in long-term resilience in unex-
pected ways.
(3) Interventions with long lead-times: in cases where measures will take many years to
implement, it may need to start now. For example:
. Removing barriers to adaptation and building adaptive capacity can take time, as it can
involve major changes in institutional, governance, and legislative structures (e.g., land
and water rights), decision processes, and cultural norms and behaviour.
. Research and development, for example, to develop and pilot new agricultural technol-
ogies can also take many years.
. Changing livelihoods and migration, for example, enabling rural communities in
unsustainable areas to move and seek new economic opportunities can take time.
This leads to a set of criteria that can help in identifying projects where it may be beneﬁcial to
future-proof now. In general, where the project or its outcomes are long-lived (i.e., long-term),
difﬁcult-to-adjust, and have a high cost or impact (i.e., high stakes) then climate change is
likely to be a central factor in design today (Ranger 2013). This framework is illustrated by
the lower three blocks in Figure 2. Conversely, where the project or its outcomes are short-
lived, low-cost, or adjustable over time,9 then accounting for long-term climate change is less
likely to be a central factor in design (Hallegatte 2009). A similar criterion for the urgency of
adaptation was used in the UK’s National Climate Change Risk Assessment (Defra 2012).
Screening methodology
To test our central hypothesis we apply our future-prooﬁng framework to the project portfolios of
two development organisations, the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), for three countries over the period January 2007 to September
Figure 2. Simple framework illustrating the conditions under which long-term climate change is likely to
be an important factor in the design of a programme.
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2013.10 All information is drawn from publicly available sources.11 Altogether we evaluate
almost 250 projects with a total value in excess of US$4.5 billion. However, this is a small
slice of total development assistance provided internationally to the countries in question. The
limited scope of the sampling means that it is not possible to generalise our conclusions, but it
does provide an initial view to guide further analysis and test the hypothesis posed by this paper.
The three countries selected are situated in East Africa (country A), South Asia (B), and the
Caribbean (C).12 The East African and South Asian countries are low income and the Caribbean
country is middle-income. The choice of country was guided by those considered to be vulnerable
to climate change and where there is clear exposure to extreme weather events today (with several
major events in the past decade). We selected countries with mid-sized portfolios (e.g., around 50
DFID projects over 2007–13) to give a good sample size. We excluded countries seen as leaders
on climate change (e.g. Ethiopia and Bangladesh) to avoid biasing our sample. The three
countries selected have very different geographies but each country is exposed to ﬂooding as
well as other forms of natural hazards.
Before applying the future-prooﬁng framework, we conducted a risk screening of all the pro-
jects in the country portfolios of the two agencies to identify those with a potential sensitivity to
climate. The aim was to produce a set of “climate-sensitive” projects similar to the 40% identiﬁed
by World Bank (2006). The risk screening was undertaken through a simple tool that combines
elements from Burton and van Aalst (2004), EuropeAid (2009), and DFID (2012a).13 This
measures two elements of sensitivity: (1) the direct or indirect effect of the intervention on the
resilience of people or systems, and (2) the sensitivity of the outcomes of the intervention to
weather. This is shown by the top two blocks in Figure 2. We note that this screening can only
tell us where there is a potential risk (Hammill and Tanner 2011) as the method does not take
any account of the quality of project risk management. The future-prooﬁng framework was
then applied to projects scored as having a medium or high sensitivity to climate. Unless other-
wise stated, all results are given in terms of numbers of projects rather than their value.
We emphasise that this analysis is preliminary and should be seen in light of the following
qualiﬁcations. First, the ﬁndings cannot be extrapolated to all developing countries and the pro-
jects may not be representative for either organisation. Second, we do not consider additional
activities within the country, including changes to development plans and the role of non-tra-
ditional donors or a broader spectrum of development activity. Third, this evaluation is based
on publicly available documents that provide a limited picture of the projects and the organis-
ations in question. For these reasons, this evaluation should be considered a snapshot that
should be deepened with further analyses.
Evaluating current action
The ﬁnal part of the analysis evaluates if and how climate is considered in the project design of
medium to high potential risk projects through a review of publicly available documentation. Pro-
jects are rated as reaching one of ﬁve levels:
Level 1. No mention of climate or climate change at all
Level 2. Climate risks mentioned in the documentation (but not climate change)
Level 3. Climate change mentioned in the documentation
Level 4. Risks from climate change to the project and/or opportunities discussed
Level 5. Signs that future-prooﬁng is integrated in the project design.14
Three constraints on this analysis are noted. First, public records are incomplete for some pro-
jects, particularly in the DFID portfolios in the earlier years; these projects are not included in the
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analysis. This means that the sample sizes for this part of the analysis are smaller. Second, even if
climate risks are mentioned in the documentation, this analysis cannot evaluate whether this was
implemented in practice and the quality of the implementation.15 The reverse is also true; if
climate risks are not mentioned in documentation, the organisations commissioned to implement
the projects may still take action to future-proof projects. This analysis can only tell us, therefore,
if risks are being identiﬁed and managed by development organisations in the early stages of
project design. Third, we ﬁnd that the description of future-prooﬁng measures in the project docu-
mentation is often highly generalised (e.g., they often refer to mainstreaming but give no details
on what this will entail speciﬁcally) and so it is difﬁcult to judge the true level of integration – in
this analysis, we tend to give the beneﬁt of the doubt, so there may be a positive bias.
Screening results
Sensitivity of portfolios to climate risks
In agreement with previous studies, we estimate that around 30% of the projects (by value) have a
medium or high potential risk, although this varies by country and portfolio from about 20% to
80% (Figure 3). This is driven by the risk proﬁle of the country and the types of projects within the
portfolio rather than being a reﬂection of the quality of risk management. About 40% of projects
(by value) were rated as negligible risk.
For country C (Caribbean), about 80% of projects (by value) are rated as high potential risk.
This could be because natural hazards and climate change are some of the greatest risks facing this
country and therefore development projects tend to focus on climate-sensitive sectors. It is also a
much smaller portfolio and the ﬁndings are skewed by a few big projects.
Figure 3. Screening of the potential sensitivity of the project outcomes to climate change.
Note: Values indicate numbers of projects.
Development in Practice 473
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
08
:49
 30
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
15
 
The highest potential risk projects across all countries are mainly major infrastructure projects
(hydropower, bridge maintenance, water supply infrastructure, and post-disaster reconstruction pro-
jects) and weather risk insurance. The DFID portfolio also includes a number of climate change adap-
tation projects that by their nature address sectors that are sensitive to climate. Medium-rated projects
tended to be major agricultural programmes, social safety net programmes, regional electricity trans-
mission line projects, water resource management, and rural roads development projects.
Figure 4 shows that between 10% and 35% of projects could potentially have a negative impact
on local resilience if climate change is not accounted for properly; this represents 30% of the portfolio
across the three countries and two organisations by value and over US$1 billion. This includes many
of those medium-to-high risk projects in Figure 3 (e.g., the failure of a hydropower station due to
climate change would threaten local resilience), but also additional projects, such as support to
extractive industries (which can both enhance and reduce resilience at different scales)16 and
urban governance (which affects urban resilience). This result should be balanced against our
ﬁnding that over 80% of projects have a strong potential to increase long-term resilience; through,
for example, building institutional capacity, increasing wealth and improving health, education
and ﬁnancial services (addressing the “adaptation deﬁcit” [Fankhauser and McDermott 2013).
Where might future-prooﬁng be justiﬁed today?
Figure 5 suggests that a signiﬁcant proportion of projects rated as having medium or high potential
risk could require urgent action to future-proof activities against climate change. This varies signiﬁ-
cantly between countries, ranging from about 5% to 55% of projects (or 2% and 30% of all projects).
Figure 6 summarises the types of projects that tend to emerge as “high urgency” in the analy-
sis. The most common are public buildings (schools, hospitals) and transport infrastructure, fol-
lowed by urban planning, infrastructure, and post-disaster reconstruction.
Figure 4. Screening of the potential for a negative impact from the project on local resilience.
Note: Values indicate numbers of projects.
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In the main these ﬁndings support our central hypothesis that in only a small number of cases
would additional action be justiﬁed today to manage expected future climate change. However,
this hypothesis does not hold for all country portfolios. In particular, country portfolios with more
major infrastructure projects (as in the World Bank portfolios) tend to require more urgent future-
prooﬁng.
Figure 5. Urgency of considering long-term climate risks in development intervention for those projects at
medium to high risk.
Note: Values indicate the numbers of projects.
Figure 6. Types of projects rated as requiring urgent action.
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Are climate risks recognised in project documentation?
Across the DFID portfolio we ﬁnd that over 90% of medium to high potential risk projects at least
mention climate change (i.e., rated Level 2 using the method outlined in Section II.c) and around
50% include some form of future-prooﬁng to climate change (Level 5) (Figure 7). However, many
of these projects are targeted climate change projects. This includes, for example, projects to
establish national climate change funds, support the development of climate change strategies,
and “climate-proof” infrastructure.
If all International Climate Fund (ICF) projects (i.e., those DFID projects speciﬁcally targeted
at climate change adaptation and mitigation) are removed from the sample, then the proportion of
projects that include some explicit future-prooﬁng falls to just over 30%, although recognition of
climate change in project documentation is still high at 88%. Examples of future-prooﬁng here
include: incorporating a monitoring strategy into a water supply project to detect signs of
climate change; mainstreaming climate change into national planning; capability building and
establishing a climate change committee as part of a social protection programme. The extent
of future-prooﬁng is variable between countries. For example, for Country C, no non-ICF projects
at medium-to-high potential risk incorporate future-prooﬁng, while for Country A half of the non-
ICF projects incorporate future-prooﬁng. This ﬁnding requires further investigation before one
could draw conclusions. For example, it may be a strategy of Country C to put all climate-sensi-
tive projects into the ICF.
Importantly, many projects that are likely to require future-prooﬁng today, like water and sani-
tation projects, rural road projects, and disaster resilience, are not ICF projects. If we focus our
sample on only these projects (i.e., non-ICF, medium-high sensitivity and likely to require
future-prooﬁng), then we ﬁnd that around one third include future-prooﬁng explicitly.
However, the sample size with available documentation is small – only six projects.
Across the World Bank portfolio, we ﬁnd that around 20% of medium-high potential risk pro-
jects mention climate change. Across the 93 projects reviewed we identiﬁed six where climate
change was explicitly considered in the project design. This included, for example, climate-proof-
ing social protection systems, post-disaster integration of climate change adaptation into recon-
struction, and incorporating knowledge generation and capacity building into projects. But
performance varies signiﬁcantly by country; for country C, all projects at least mention climate
risks (Level 2) and almost half integrate resilience to climate change into the project design
(Level 5). This might be a reﬂection of the political economy of the county in question that
would inﬂuence the scope of options proposed for IDA assistance.
Of those World Bank projects that we suggest are likely to require future-prooﬁng today (16 pro-
jects in total), we ﬁnd only one where future-prooﬁng measures are explicitly incorporated into the
design documentation. However, the sample size is too small to draw conclusions. The recent World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group’s evaluation of the World Bank portfolio (IEG 2012) conducted
a more extensive review and concluded that there is a general lack of forward-looking, pro-active
development projects, which anticipate future risks and act to reduce them ahead of time.
There are clear signs of improvement in integration of climate change in both portfolios.
Figure 8 shows the proportion of all medium to high potential risk projects, where documentation
is available,17 that at least reference climate change in their documentation (i.e., reach at least
Level 3 above) divided into two time periods (by project start date): 2007 to 2010 and 2011 to
2013. We ﬁnd that all of the medium-high potential risk DFID projects at least reference
climate change in the latter period and the proportion of World Bank projects mentioning
climate change improves from 14% to 22%. This estimate is consistent with the IEG evaluation
of the World Bank’s experience on mainstreaming adaptation (IEG 2012), which found the pro-
portion of all World Bank projects mentioning climate change adaptation increased from less than
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Figure 7. Level of integration of climate risks and climate change in the project documentation of medium
and high risk projects: (top) World Bank portfolio and (bottom) DFID portfolio.
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1% in 2000 to around 12% by 2011. This is a clear improvement from situation pre-2007 based on
Klein et al. (2007), which reviewed the portfolios of six development agencies and concluded that
climate risks were not well assessed and rarely mentioned in project documentation.
The higher level of integration within the DFID portfolio may partly reﬂect the introduction of
the Climate and Environment Appraisal (CEA) process in late 2010. This made it mandatory for all
DFID project business cases to include an assessment of the potential risks and opportunities from
climate change to the project. DFID’s Strategic Programme Review (2010/11), International
Climate Fund and “Future Fit” initiative (2012/13), may also have driven greater awareness and
incentives for integration. Over the period of this study, assessment of climate change risks was
not mandatory within World Bank projects. In addition, the World Bank is a far larger organisation,
so integration at the project level will inevitably take longer to achieve. Given that climate change is
a special theme for IDA 17, we expect the level of integration to increase over the coming years.18
For all these ﬁndings, we reiterate our earlier qualiﬁcation that just because climate change is
integrated into the project documentation, this does not necessarily mean that the project is suc-
cessful in building long-term resilience. This is an assessment of process rather than outcomes. In
addition, we have found that the discussion of future-prooﬁng in project documentation tends to
be highly general and so it is difﬁcult to draw robust conclusions on the level of integration (e.g.,
often discussing mainstreaming without giving details). More detailed study is required to assess
the true extent of integration of future-prooﬁng into the project design and, more importantly, the
project outcome. Such a study would require on-the-ground evaluation of projects.
Identifying best practice in future-prooﬁng
This ﬁnal part of the analysis aims to identify examples of best practice in future-prooﬁng across
the portfolios of the two development organisations. To do this, we propose a framework for what
future-prooﬁng would look like in practice for development projects, based on those proposed by
Klein et al. (2007), McGray et al. (2007), and OECD (2009).
Each of these three studies suggests that future-prooﬁng does not necessarily mean that pro-
jects will look radically different or that they will be more expensive. Klein et al. (2007) stress that
Figure 8. Proportion of projects rated as medium to high potential risk that at least reference climate change
in the publicly-available documentation.
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future-prooﬁng is not necessarily about technological measures, like building bigger pipes in drai-
nage programmes or drought-resistant crops, but can also include training and capacity building
and institutional support. McGray et al. (2007) suggest that adaptation can entail a continuum of
measures, from “low-regret” measures like reducing vulnerability and capacity building, through
to making more signiﬁcant adjustments to plan to explicitly address future risks, such as reloca-
tion and radical technological change (OECD 2009). This is consistent with our ﬁndings from the
review of the portfolios from three countries.
We suggest that a similar continuum applies to future-prooﬁng development projects. For
some projects, low-regret measures may be sufﬁcient, but a few may need to move further up
to continuum toward major adjustments. Figure 9 illustrates this continuum; the pyramid structure
reﬂects our hypothesis that there will be fewer projects requiring more radical adaptations. In this
section, we describe our proposed continuum and give best-practice examples from the wider
portfolios of the World Bank and DFID.
In line with McGray et al. (2007), we suggest that the ﬁrst and second levels of the continuum
of integrating long-term climate change are: increasing efforts to reduce vulnerability through
good development and reducing other stresses; and building general capacity, including investing
in knowledge and skills. Fankhauser et al. (1999) showed that long-term climate risks increases
the rationale for moving faster and harder on core development and disaster resilience, and for
investing in information. From our review of the portfolios of three countries, we ﬁnd that
most projects (more than 80%) are likely to have positive impacts on resilience to climate change.
An example is the “Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme” (ASAP) (DFID
2012b), launched in 2012 by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
ASAP works in 40 countries to invest in practices and knowledge to build the capacity of small-
holder farmers to manage current risks and adapt to climate change.19 It aims to safeguard the
Figure 9. An illustrative scale of how the inclusion of climate change within interventions today may alter
those interventions, relative to the counterfactual.
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food systems on which poor smallholder farmers depend and to demonstrate how to scale up prac-
tices and technologies that build resilience and increase prosperity.
Another example is the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) Climate Smart
Initiative (CSI) (World Bank 2013b). The PSNP provides food and cash to food insecure Ethio-
pians; in a typical year 14 million Ethiopians do not have enough food to eat and climate varia-
bility is an important underlying driver.20 To address chronic food security over the long term,
Ethiopia needs to build a consideration of climate change into its current food security program-
ming. The PSNP CSI will enhance adaptive capacity through improving information ﬂows, such
as weather information and early warning systems, and supporting local decision-making in the
PSNP. It will also help to build capacity to adapt for the long term by enabling communities to
diversify livelihoods and promote technological innovation.
The third level is where projects begin to look very different. The focus here is not on making
radical changes now, but on designing the project so that it can anticipate, learn, and evolve over
time to cope with changing climate risks, while still achieving its objectives (Walker et al. 2013).
A commonly cited example is the Thames Estuary 2100 Project, where instead of building a
costly new ﬂood barrier for London today, a plan was developed that allowed the ﬂood manage-
ment system to be adjusted incrementally over time as more is learnt about future risks. The same
principles can be transferred to development interventions (Ranger 2013); an example is an adap-
tive social protection system, which is designed from the start to expand or contract in response to
changing needs (IDS 2012). A number of the projects reviewed from the three sets of portfolios
included features that aimed to build adaptive capacity. For example, one project recommended a
monitoring system as part of a water supply programme to detect early signs of climate change.
These ﬁrst three levels are low-regret; they are low cost and likely to have beneﬁts today and
in the future (OECD 2009). The next two levels entail measures that are designed explicitly to
account for future risks now. Designing these types of projects will likely require more technical
expertise and information, including detailed analyses of risks under different climate and socio-
economic scenarios and quantitative assessments of options. This is likely to apply to ﬁxed, long-
lived capital investments that are difﬁcult to adjust.
The fourth level is akin to Klein et al.’s (2007) building bigger pipes in drainage programmes
or drought-resistant crops. It can mean changes in engineering (such as higher sea walls, better
drainage systems, resilient school buildings), new practices (climate-smart agriculture), new pol-
icies (water permits, resilient urban zoning, and stronger building codes), and different technol-
ogies (rainwater harvesting, insurance) (OECD 2009). Two examples from across the whole
portfolio of the two organisations are:
. The Haiti Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (CIF 2013), which conducts a
detailed assessment of climate change risks and proposes a strategy to engineer its infra-
structure, agricultural systems, and coastal cities to cope with future risk, as well investing
in measures to build adaptive capacity through climate monitoring, training, and insti-
tutional strengthening.
. The US$412 million Trung Son Hydropower project in Vietnam that adopted high safety
standards, zoning and warning systems, and built a secondary “fuse dam” to reduce the
risks associated with failure due to changing river ﬂows (IEG 2012). Several projects
within the three sets of portfolios reviewed referred to climate-prooﬁng programmes and
infrastructure, and mainstreaming climate change into policies and plans.
Finally, the ﬁfth level is the potential transformation of a project where a major change is
required. For example, Stafford-Smith et al. (2011) describe how in the highest risk areas, com-
munities may need to radically change where and how they live to cope with climate change. One
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example is a small-island state, where populations may need to relocate to escape rising sea levels.
We suggest that in some cases, development projects may need to similarly transform, or drive
transformational change in societies.
We found few examples of where this has been done in practice in the literature and none from
the three sets of portfolios reviewed. An example is a recent World Bank project in India (reported by
IEG 2012). The Indian portion of the Sundarbans, a great mangrove-dominated delta facing the Bay
of Bengal, is home to more than four million poor people. Many live at or below sea level and are at
constant risk from ﬂoods and cyclone. An analysis found that many well-intentioned and apparently
adaptive activities, like strengthening embankments, were maladaptive, boosting long-term vulner-
ability. While there are urgent poverty challenges it concluded business-as-usual development is
not sustainable in the long-term. Instead, the project proposes that the Sundarbans embark on a multi-
generational plan to re-engineer estuary management (e.g., moving back defences and allowing man-
groves to recover) and enable welfare-improving voluntary out-migration from the most threatened
areas, including through education. In the short term, this would be complemented by investments in
early warning systems; cyclone shelters; and health, water, and sanitation services (IEG 2012). These
types of programmes can be extensive and entail difﬁcult and complex trade-offs.
Discussion
This study has suggested a relatively low integration of future-prooﬁng strategies into the recent
projects of two development organisations for three countries since 2007. While it is not possible
to extrapolate these ﬁndings to other countries and organisations in this study, other studies have
reached similar conclusions (e.g., IEG 2012).
Given this, it is important to consider what the barriers are to integrating climate change into
development programmes. Practical experience within development agencies, such as the two
described in this paper, suggests that there are many. This is also reﬂected in the existing academic
literature. For example, Hammill and Tanner (2011) report that the difﬁculties in identifying and
assessing climate and complex vulnerability information is often cited as one of the biggest chal-
lenges here. There is also a lack of information about the costs and beneﬁts of different adaptation
measures and until recently, little robust or systematic monitoring and evaluation of adaptation.
However, other literature suggest more fundamental political, structural, ﬁnancial, and behav-
ioural barriers. Historically, planning and policy-making is often slow to react to changes in the
external environment and institutions have limited capacity to learn from and foresee change.
Jones et al. (2013) concludes that the majority of climate/disaster resilience and humanitarian pro-
jects tend to be either reactive (managing events as they happen) or deliberative (learning from the
recent past and adapting to it). The challenges to future-prooﬁng may include21:
. There may be a general lack of awareness of the issues.
. Lack of experience in future-prooﬁng amongst development organisations – this is a new
agenda and learning is required so it will take time to implement fully.
. Future-prooﬁng will require more time, resources, information, and technical capacities, in
an environment where there are already constraints.
. The administrative separation of ﬁnance for speciﬁc and additional adaptation from normal
development programme ﬁnance may also create a barrier in this respect.
. The short duration of many development projects (only around three to ﬁve years).
. The incentives on development professionals for projects that deliver rapid impacts and high
returns on investment will tend to reduce investment in adaptation, which is often percieved
as having more uncertain, long-term, difﬁcult-to-quantify, and sometimes intangible beneﬁts.
. A lack of long-term monitoring and evaluation systems for adaptation.
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Another often cited challenge in integrating future climate into decisions today is the uncer-
tainty over long-term climate projections (IPCC 2013). Most risk assessments are based on his-
toric data; but planning for climate change requires a more forward-looking approach. The risk of
getting it wrong increases as one moves up the continuum of adaptation. For the ﬁrst three types of
adjustments (Figure 9), uncertainty is unlikely to be important as the measures are “low-regret”
(OECD 2009). Where major changes to plans are made to account for long-term climate change,
the potential for maladaptation is greater. Uncertainty means that we cannot optimise the design of
a project to a particular future climate. However, in theory this should not be a barrier to integrat-
ing resilience to climate change into development projects (Ranger 2013). A desirable approach is
one that is “robust, meaning that it performs well under a wide variety of futures, and adaptive,
meaning that it can be adapted to changing (unforeseen) future conditions” (Walker et al. 2013,
p. 956). There are tools available to help do this in practice, for example so-called futures
techniques like scenario planning and methods for decision making under uncertainty
(Ranger 2013).22
A further issue is the potential trade-offs between long-term resilience and short-term poverty
alleviation (Dercon 2012). For example, more drought-resistant crops tend to have lower pro-
ductivity. Another example is the Sundarbans case given above. In that case a balance was
struck by both planning for the long term by relocating some people and investing in building
resilience and reducing poverty in the near term. These so-called wicked problems in adaptation
require a high level of understanding of the complex societal processes that generate poverty and
vulnerability (Klein et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2013).
What more can be done to enable and promote future-prooﬁng of development projects?
Appropriate evidence and tools are a foundation to this; for example, there is a need for
further economic analysis to identify where and how long-term risks should be built into projects
today and to provide learning examples. Training and skills will also be important in applying
evidence and tools in practice. But the most important advance must be to build an institution
that creates the right incentives to integrate climate change; this requires leadership to institute
a cultural change that places a greater value on the long-term sustainability of development invest-
ments and progress.
Both organisations are working to deliver both speciﬁc climate change interventions and also
mainstream climate change across other areas through portfolio screening or safeguard systems.
For example, the DFID Future Fit programme initiative aims to integrate long-term resilience to
climate change and resource scarcity across all DFID programmes. Coupling climate change resi-
lience to the disaster resilience agenda (DFID 2011b), provides an opportunity to do this more
efﬁciently.23 For the World Bank, climate change is a special theme for IDA 17 and the Bank
has committed to integrate climate risk into all new developments (World Bank 2013c). It is
also worth noting the Management Response to the recent IEG evaluation of World Bank experi-
ence with adaptation.24 We recognise that changing the operations, practices, and behaviours of
large institutions takes considerable effort, time, and leadership. This evaluation should therefore
be considered an initial snapshot and should be repeated after IDA 17 and broadened with further
analyses.
Conclusions
This article gives a framework for identifying where and how development projects should integrate
long-term climate risks into their design today. We conclude that portfolio-level screening can be a
useful tool, but more project-speciﬁc evaluations are needed to assess the extent to which long-
term climate is being integrated into projects in practice and the barriers faced by development pro-
fessionals in this area.
482 N. Ranger et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
08
:49
 30
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
15
 
Acknowledgements
We thank Sarah Arnold for her assistance in the portfolio analysis and John Carstensen, Jane Clark, Stéphane
Hallegatte, Richard Teuten, and Tim Wheeler for their comments. Any remaining errors are our own. Nicola
Ranger’s research was supported by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the ESRC Centre for
Climate Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of their institutions.
Notes on contributor
Nicola Ranger (corresponding author) works at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Alex Harvey works at the Department for International Development, London, UK.
Su-Lin Garbett-Shiels works at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,
London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Department for International Development,
London UK.
Notes
1. Data provided by Munich Re.
2. Adaptation can be deﬁned as “adjustments in human and natural systems, in response to actual or expected
climate stimuli or their effects, that moderate harm or exploit beneﬁcial opportunities”: IPCC (2012).
3. UNFCCC Document FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (paragraph 8)
4. Joint MDB Report on Adaptation Finance 2011: A report by a group of Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs) comprising the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment
Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB) and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC). Accessed September 20, 2013. http://www.eib.org/attachments/
documents/joint_mdb_report_on_adaptation_ﬁnance_2011.pdf
5. Aid statistics from OECD DAC. Accessed September 20, 2013. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm.
6. “Future-prooﬁng” is deﬁned here an additional action to anticipate future risks and act now to reduce
them ahead of time. We emphasise “additional” because in some cases the measures to cope with future
risks are the same as those needed for current risks, e.g., building institutional capacity. Future-proof-
ing is one part of “climate-prooﬁng”, which includes taking action to manage existing climate risks.
The distinction is important as managing existing climate risks often bring immediate beneﬁts,
whereas for “future-prooﬁng” the full beneﬁts will not be realised until later.
7. Such estimates should be interpreted with caution as the costs will vary signiﬁcantly between projects.
8. This includes real costs, such as building a hydropower station so it that operates under a wider range
of river ﬂows, opportunity costs, and beneﬁts foregone (e.g., from building on ﬂood plains).
9. Short-lived, ﬂexible, and lower-cost projects can provide major opportunities to build resilience to
climate (Klein et al. 2007), but this is not a focus of this paper.
10. The start date, 2007, is chosen as we suggest that this roughly the point in time when the linkages
between climate change and poverty alleviation became much clearer and more mainstream in think-
ing, following the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change in 2007, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in late 2006, and the Glenea-
gles G8 dialogue (with climate change and poverty as its two priority issues) in 2005.
11. Accessed September 20, 2013. DFID Development Tracker. http://devtracker.dﬁd.gov.uk/ and World
Bank Projects Database. http://www.worldbank.org/projects. Accessed September 20, 2013. For DFID
projects, the business case is the main source of information used and if not available, the most recent
Annual Review or project completion report. For the World Bank projects, the Project Information
Document is the main source of information use, though Project Appraisals, Environmental Assess-
ments, and Implementation and Results Reports are also used.
12. The countries remain anonymous in this paper.
13. These rules are also consistent with guidance by USAID, GIZ, NORAD, and others (Hammill and
Tanner 2011).
14. For example, the project might include measures to reduce climate risks or build capacity to cope with
climate change, or climate risks may feature in the options appraisal.
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15. For example, there it is difﬁcult to establish whether climate change is merely name-checked or tick-boxed
instead of being truly integrated into the project. This would require deeper investigation at project level.
16. Extractive industries could, in local terms, reduce resilience of the environment and local communities.
However, at the national scale they could improve the ability of a country to manage external economic
shocks (UNECA 2013).
17. For some DFID projects, particularly in the earlier period, no project documentation is publicly available.
18. IDA 17 is the next funding phase of the International Development Association (IDA), the part of the
World Bank that focuses on helping the world’s poorest countries.
19. These will include small-scale water harvesting and storage, ﬂood protection, irrigation systems, agrofor-
estry, and conservation agriculture, strengthening farmers access to markets and information (e.g., weather
forecasts), and working with governments on policies to enable growth and climate resilience agriculture.
20. This is in return for labour for those who can provide it (around 80% of beneﬁciaries), and as a grant to
those who are elderly and sick (around 20%) (DFID 2012b).
21. Challenges identiﬁed by the authors based on the literature review summarised by IPCC 2012.
22. See also, for example, the work of the Mediation programme (http://www.mediation-project.eu/
platform/pbs/home.html) funded under the EU’s 7th FP.
23. DFID conducted a number of activities to integrate disaster resilience into programmes, including
pilots and risk assessments (DFID 2011b). A similar framework would be needed to deliver climate
change resilience. Coupling the two processes together would therefore be more efﬁcient.
24. World Bank, Washington, DC. “Management Response to the IEG 2012.” Accessed September 20,
2013. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/chapters/cc3_mgmt_response.pdf
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Appendix: Climate Change Risk Screening Tool
The project screening conducted in this study aims to identify where there are potential risks to a project,
based on a set of attributes and criteria about the programme. The attributes and criteria are taken from Eur-
opeAid (2009), DFID (2012a) and Burton and van Aalst (2007) (which are all similar). It is a simple rules-
based rating tool, similar to those currently used by DFID, USAID, ADB and GIZ (Hammill and Tanner,
2011). The tool used in this paper also screens where action may be needed today to enhance the resilience
of the project to long-term climate change. These attributes, explained in Section II and Figure 2, are drawn
from Defra (2012). The tool inevitably requires some professional judgement to apply. To reduce biases, we
calibrate our ratings against the examples given by Burton and van Aalst (2007). The tool beneﬁts from a
basic level of knowledge about how climate change may affect the country(s) in which the project operates.
A. POTENTIAL DIRECT OR INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON PROJECT
OUTCOMES
Is the achievement of the programme’s objectives directly and signiﬁcantly dependent on the climate over the
coming ten years or more?
Could the programmes objectives be indirectly affected by climate change? E.g. The achievement of objec-
tives in a rural development programme may be highly dependent on the availability of increasingly scarce
water for irrigation
High Possible major threat to long-term success of project E.g. The projects is a large fraction composed
climate sensitive sector (e.g. >50% agriculture, infrastructure or water) and entails climate sensitive
activities (e.g. irrigation, water supply management, malaria).
Medium Outcome of project could be affected by climate, but unlikely to be a major threat to long-term
success. E.g. Some elements of the project are subject to climate risks (e.g. >20% in climate
sensitive sectors or with >10% climate sensitive activates) or exposed to indirect effects from
climate change (e.g. schools in risky areas). Also, projects that are climate-sensitive, but are
likely to have beneﬁts under any climate (e.g. social protection, capacity building in agriculture).
Low Climate change unlikely to be a threat to long-term success of programme. Minor inclusion of
climate sensitive sectors and activities OR potential indirect effects from climate change.
Negligible Climate sensitive activities make a negligible fraction of the project
B. EFFECT OF THE PROJECT ON LOCAL OR REGIONAL VULNERABILITY
Are there any indications at this stage that the project could have positive impacts on vulnerability? (Y/N)
e.g. Does the project enhance governance capacity?
Are there indications that the project may increase the vulnerability of the population to climate variability
and/or the expected effects of climate change?
High Project could have a strong effect on the climate risks facing the country or region. E.g. infrastructure
could trigger development in dangerous areas, even if the infrastructure itself is not at risk.
Medium Project may have indirect effects on the vulnerability of communities. E.g.an agricultural market
reform project that removes subsidies from certain crops can lead farmers to switch to crops that
could make them more vulnerable to climate variability and change.
C. URGENCY OF INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE
(i) LIFETIME: How long will the outcomes of the project last: Long (>30 years), Medium (10–30 years),
Short (<10 years).
(ii) FLEXIBILITY: How easy it is to change the activities to adjust over time? (Low, Medium, High). E.g.
Infrastructure is an inﬂexible investment, whereas early warning systems can be adjusted every year
(iii) SCALE: How large is the project: Large (>50 m), Medium (>5 m), Small (<5 m).
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